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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [CWC](#)
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
44TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION

REF: STATE 39953

This is CWC-26-06.

SUMMARY

1. (U) The 44th Executive Council session of March 14-17 resulted in modest movement on some issues of importance to the U.S. Most critical was what did not happen: there was no protracted discussion of the fact that the U.S. did not provide its extension request for the 100% destruction deadline. This was due to the expectation that the U.S. will submit the request before April 29, 2006 as required by the Convention. There was agreement on the Russian 45% destruction deadline and no language linking foreign assistance to Russian obligations. Discussions with the Russian delegation provided useful insights into the Russian destruction program. Text regarding biomedical sampling capability was noted. The Iraqi Ambassador and members of his Embassy staff attended the EC as observers. Finally, informal discussions generated substantial support for UK Ambassador Parker to be the head of the working group preparing for the Second RevCon, supported by vice-chairpersons from the other regional groups. The March 13 donors meeting, destruction informals and discussions with the Albanians are also reported below. End Summary.

ITEM 3 - STATEMENT BY THE DG

2. (U) The Director-General spoke on the usual themes: there are 12 CW destruction facilities in operation this intersessional period; the Technical Secretariat confirmed the soundness of the U.S. optimization approach; Russia will destroy 45% of its Category 1 CW stockpiles by December 31, 2009 and it is requesting the EC decide to set this date as the phase 3 deadline. He noted that Albania plans to start destruction operations at the Qaf-Molla CWDF in July. The DG also noted the initial destruction deadline set out in the CWC is near and the international community will be expecting possessor states to increase their destruction efforts. Any hesitation or uncertainties could damage the credibility and

effectiveness of the CWC. The DG commented that the present ratio of industry inspections is still too low and he hoped States Parties will support a quantitative increase in this type of inspection. He further noted an uncertainty in an initial Schedule 2 inspection in the UK, and that they are working together to resolve the issue.

13. (U) Under ICA, the DG noted TS efforts to assist national authorities, and to implement the CWC, and cited technical assistance visits. He remarked on support of SPs for their Associate and Internship Support Programs, and improving national capacity building. He particularly noted EU political support and voluntary contributions, and the continued offering of courses on analytical techniques. The DG noted there are now 178 member states, however North Korea continues to remain unengaged on the CWC and there are still a number of Middle Eastern countries that are not yet signatories. He mentioned that the TS will soon host the third workshop on universality in the Mediterranean Basin, with the date and venue announced in the near future.

14. (U) The DG noted 96% of annual contributions were paid in 2005, but were not made until the last quarter of the year, creating a problem for the TS in planning and delivering the approved program over the course of the year. He said the TS is addressing procurement issues highlighted by SPs, the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matter, the Office of Internal Oversight, and External Auditor. He also noted the development of initiatives to improve TS management of positions in regards to tenure. The DG expects Ralf Trapp's study on the policy to be ready before the summer holidays. The DG said the TS will ask for additional funds for training and staff development in the 2007 draft budget, noting the OPCW currently spends 0.5% of its budget on this

area, compared with the 2% the UN recommends. The DG announced the Prime Minister of the Netherlands will attend the first observance of the Day of Remembrance for victims of chemical warfare on April 27, 2006. He also announced the TS is working on plans to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention in April 2007. Finally, the DG saluted Deputy DG Brian Hawtin who will be leaving the OPCW shortly and welcomed his successor, John Freeman.

ITEM 4 - GENERAL DEBATE

15. (U) There were nineteen speakers during the General Debate, most touched on the usual issues, including Article VII, universality, and African office. The primary topic in most statements was destruction deadlines. Nearly all countries and regional statements addressed the issue, many making the point that all destruction should be completed within the April 2012 timeframe laid out in the CWC. New Zealand and Norway noted they have made or will make, additional contributions to Russia's destruction efforts. The topic of OPCW site selection was a hot button for New Zealand. Their Ambassador also noted their displeasure with the facilitator's paper. Malaysia on behalf of NAM, Iran and Cuba noted that political elements should not be used as an element in the methodology. Norway, New Zealand and NAM also noted there needs to be a more equitable geographic distribution factor. New Zealand used solid numbers to back up their statement, in particular noting that soon they will be undergoing a second round of inspections on their facilities.

16. (U) The usual delegations, including NAM, Iran and Cuba, noted that Article XI needs to be fully implemented, in particular, unresolved issues in subparagraphs 2 (c) and 2(e) of the article. Others mentioned it in relation to "peaceful uses of chemistry." Some delegations mentioned the 2008 Review Conference and the need for a good facilitator to run the working group, further stating it must be a consensus decision. Sudan suggested it be presided by two Ambassadors, noting they could supply one of them. Japan commented on the

importance of timely submission of declarations. There was reference to the subjects of assessed contributions and regularization of payments, the OPCW's role in fighting global terrorism, optimization of EC work, challenge inspections, forming a host country committee, and the OPCW MOU with the African Union. China commented that Japan is lagging behind on abandoned CW in China and Japan replied in its statement on the work they have done, pointing out the difficulties involved. Cuba again mentioned the U.S. blockade.

¶17. (U) Delegations welcomed the Iraqi observers, noting it was a positive measure for their accession to the treaty. (EC Chairman Dastis had simply raised the Iraqi request before the EC began, and Iraqi attendance was adopted without any discussion.) Iran first noted they were victims of chemical weapons by the former government of Iraq, then went on to say approval of Iraq's presence at observers at an EC should not be seen as a precedent for other non-State Parties, and stated any other requests to come to ECs or CSPs as observers should be decided by the EC on a case-by-case basis.

ITEM 5 - STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

¶18. (U) Item 5.1: The EC agreed to defer until the next session the verification plan for the CWDF in India. The U.S. stated that it was unable to join consensus until the draft associated facility agreement has been distributed and reviewed. India informed the EC during the general debate that it requested to the OPCW on March 14, 2006 an extension to the 100 percent deadline. The U.S. del learned later that India is requesting a date in 2009.

¶19. (U) Item 5.2: The EC deferred until its next session the verification plan for the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility. The Russian delegation indicated that it was now satisfied with a resolution on Newport, but there was insufficient time to get approval from Moscow. Such approval may be sufficient to ward off German objections on Newport.

¶110. (U) Item 5.3: The EC approved the verification plan for the Pine Bluff Binary Destruction Facility.

¶111. (U) Item 5.4: The EC approved the amendments to the verification plan for the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility.

¶112. (U) Item 5.5: The EC agreed to note the Note by the TS on corrections to the Russian Federation detailed plan for the conversion of the sarin CWPf at Volgograd and approved the corrections.

¶113. (U) Item 5.6: A State Party, the U.S. and Russia reported orally on the progress made in meeting the revised deadline. The U.S. referred to the detailed presentation provided at the March 13 destruction informals and noted that copies of the presentation were available to delegations.

¶114. (U) Item 5.7: The EC noted the report by the DG on the progress that has been made in meeting the revised deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons.

¶115. (U) Item 5.8: The EC approved the Russian 45 percent deadline extension of its Category 1 CW. The U.S., Germany, France, UK and Austria (representing the EU) raised with Russia the concern of the linkage in the draft decision document between Russia's ability to meet deadlines and the receipt of foreign assistance. The U.S. suggested that Russia consider much simpler language concerning transparency as was contained in the October 2003 CSP decision (C-8/DEC.13, 24 October 2003) and to avoid any political links to international assistance. Russia agreed to consider those concerns. The matter was ultimately resolved with a revision on the decision language (EC-44/DEC/CRP.8, dated 16 March 2006). The deadline extension request suffered from

some last minute intervention by Italy (legitimately during the discussion of this agenda item) and South Africa (not so legitimately, during the discussion of report language) pleading for additional time to consider the revision.

¶16. (U) Item 5.9: A State Party request on the extension of the 100 percent deadline for the destruction of Category 1 CW stockpile was adopted by the EC. The State Party agreed to report every 90 days as is required under Part IV (A), paragraph 28 of the Verification Annex.

¶17. (U) Item 5.10: The EC noted the report by the DG on progress in implementing the decision regarding the implementation of Article VII obligations. The U.S. made an intervention on three points as per guidance regarding the document. The new facilitator, Ambassador Maartin Lak (the Netherlands), introduced himself and called for SPs to work together to resolve outstanding issues like the establishment of national authorities and the enacting of penal legislation. The Article VII working group met to consider report language for the EC, which led to an acceptable outcome, and, more importantly, provided indications that Lak will be an active, efficient facilitator ready to cooperate with the U.S.

¶18. (U) Item 5.11: The EC deferred until the next session the facility agreement for the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility.

¶19. (U) Item 5.12: The EC adopted the Japanese facility agreement for its Schedule 1 facility for protective purposes.

¶20. (U) Item 5.13: The EC adopted the Pine Bluff Binary Destruction facility agreement.

¶21. (U) Item 5.14 and 5.15: The EC noted the TS note on amendments to the facility agreement regarding on-site inspections at the Anniston Chemical Destruction Facility and adopted the amendments to the verification plan at Anniston.

¶22. (U) Item 5.16: At the request of Iran, the EC deferred until the next session the Note by the DG on the update on progress with schedule 2 facility agreements (EC-44/DG.1, dated 2 December 2005). Iran's intervention resulted in report language calling for the TS to prepare further updated reports on progress with Schedule 2 facility agreements to consider at the next EC Session.

¶23. (U) Item 5.17: On the issue of the status of annual declarations, the UK, Germany and Japan all made interventions from the floor on the importance of submitting declarations or "nil" declaration on past activities on a timely basis. The EC report called for the need to continue consultation within the corresponding cluster during the intersessional period. (Note: it appears likely that del rep Larry Denyer will be announced soon as the facilitator for this issue.)

ITEM 6 - BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES

¶24. (U) The EC noted the discussions on biomedical sampling of the report of the Eighth Session of the Scientific Advisory Board (section 5 of SAB-8/1, dated 10 February 2006) and the note by the DG on the report (para 5 of EC-44/DG.7, dated 8 March 2006). See the discussion on Agenda Item 14 below concerning the remainder of the SAB report, which was only received.

ITEM 7 - OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE

¶25. (U) The EC was asked to consider and approve three notes on new validation data, EC-42/DG.6, dated 31 August 2005, which was deferred from the Forty Third Session, and

EC-44/DG.3 and EC44/DG.4, both dated 13 February 2006. India expressed concerns about potential confidential business information considerations, and the inadequate time available for review. At their request, and with support from a small number of other SPs, the EC decided that all three notes would be considered further at the next session. The EC also requested the TS submit a note assessing the implication of data contained in EC-42/DG.6 for the activities of the SPs.

ITEM 8 - AFRICA OFFICE

¶26. (U) The facilitator of the consultations on the establishment of an OPCW Office in Africa, Malik Azhar Ellahi of Pakistan, reported on the results of the consultations. He also had submitted to the EC prior to March 1, 2006 a non-paper on the results of the consultations, which recommended a broader review of the situation before decision. The South African delegation declared that a temporary office in Africa would not be a satisfactory solution, but this was not supported by other delegations.

ITEM 9 - WORKING GROUP TO PREPARE
FOR SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE

27 (U) EC Chairman Dastis opened discussion on the establishment of an open-ended working group for preparations for the Second RevCon and announced that he has conducted consultations with regional groups. However, he has not been able to reach a consensus on a nominee for the facilitator of the group, and plans to continue consultations. Delegations were of the opinion that this is a very important issue, and thus the choice of a facilitator should not be rushed.

¶28. (U) This was a major topic of side-bar discussions. The resulting straw polls show significant support for UK

Ambassador Parker to chair the group, and complete acceptance that the Iranian Ambassador, who had announced last year that he wanted the post, could not get it. However, the Iranian Ambassador is not yet ready to join consensus, and reaching an agreement was especially difficult as he was in Tehran for consultations the entire week of the EC. There were a number of attempts to try to find a formulation that might address his concerns. One bizarre suggestion that came from South Africa was a co-chairmanship (presumably a UK-Iranian pairing) that was put forth publicly by Sudan. That has now died a well-deserved death. There is now general consensus on an approach mirroring the EC with a chairman supported by vice-chairs from the other regional groups. Dastis has indicated that he will meet with the Iranian Ambassador on his return to outline the sentiment of delegations.

ITEM 10 - EC RATIONALIZATION

¶29. (U) The Russian facilitator of discussions on the EC rationalization, Victor Smirnovskiy, reported on March 10 consultations. He noted the proposal to pass consideration of the matter to the working group for the Second RevCon. However, South Africa went directly to the TS to insert language (without the knowledge of the Russian Vice-Chair) asking that a TS paper on the status of outstanding items on the EC agenda be submitted to EC-46. All delegations objected to that proposal. After much debate, the EC requested that the TS paper, together with the original South African paper on the CW cluster, be submitted to the working group.

ITEM 11 - OIO AND EXTERNAL AUDITOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

¶30. (U) Item 11.1: The EC noted the Report on the Implementation in 2005 of the recommendations contained in the 2004 annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight. The facilitator, Chiho Komuro (Japan), also provided a brief oral report on the consultation held on the report.

¶31. (U) Item 11.2: The EC noted the Note by the TS on the status of implementation of the recommendations of the External Auditor. Komuro announced that she would hold consultations on the note during the intersessional period.

ITEM 12 - PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

¶32. (U) Privileges and immunities agreements with Colombia and Madagascar were concluded. Del rep made the usual statement from the floor per reftel instructions.

ITEM 13 - ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ISSUES

¶33. (U) Item 13.1: The EC deferred action on the consideration of a mechanism for SPs to regularize the payment of their dues to the OPCW. Jae-woong Lee (ROK) and Florian Antohi (Romania) were announced as co-facilitators on the issue and will be convening consultations in the near-future.

¶34. (U) Item 13.2: The EC approved the classification of two posts (EC-43/DG.7/Add.2, dated February 23, 2006) that had not been approved at EC-43, as the position descriptions had not yet been completed.

¶35. (U) Item 13.3: The EC noted the report by the DG on OPCW income and expenditure for the financial year to December 31, ¶2005.

¶36. (U) Item 13.4: The EC deferred action on the Draft Financial Rules of the OPCW. Facilitator Rick Snelsire (U.S.), noted that much progress had been made in recent

consultations and that he hoped that the Financial Rules could be approved in the near future.

ITEM 14 - SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD

¶37. (U) The SAB chair and the head of the SAB working group on biomedical sampling made themselves available to address questions from the EC on their respective reports. In the end, the EC received the report of the Eighth Session of the SAB, while noting the relevant discussions on biomedical sampling within these documents (section 5 and para 5, respectively). The reason for this awkward decision was because some delegations felt they needed more time for their capitals to review the remaining details of the report and DG's note.

ITEM 15 - ANTI-TERRORISM

¶38. (U) The EC was asked to note the DG's note on the OPCW's contribution to global anti-terrorist efforts. Facilitator Sophie Moal-Makame (France) briefed the EC, with emphasis on the recent useful interaction with the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism. Several SPs spoke in support of the report and the ongoing effort by the open-ended working group, with "WMD" mitigation concepts mentioned by several SPs. Comment was also made that anti-terrorism should be included within the scope of RevCon preparation. South Africa, supported by India, noted the need for more time to review the note in context of the working group's mandate. Thus, the note was acknowledged as having been received and will be considered further at the next EC.

ITEM 16 - ELECTION OF EC CHAIR AND VICE-CHAIRS

¶39. (U) The EC elected Ambassador Hlengiwe Buhle Mkihze of South Africa as the new Chairperson, and the permanent representatives of Colombia, Germany, Iran, and Russian Federation as its new Vice-Chairpersons. (Note: There are repeated references in the preceding paragraphs to difficulties raised by the South African delegate. Unfortunately, his behavior at this EC was the rule, not the exception, and it has generated concern among delegations about whether the South African chairperson will have the kind of support needed to be effective. Amb. Javits has emphasized to his South African counterpart that he wants her to have a successful tenure in the chair, and that it is important that she have a skillful and respected officer to help her achieve that goal.)

ITEM 17 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS

¶40. (U) A number of delegations raised concerns about the OPCW Memorandum of Understanding with the African Union and other similar agreements. The DG expressed his intent to report to EC-45 on the issue generally, the MOU with the African Union and other regional organizations specifically, as well as similar documents.

RUSSIA BILATERAL

¶41. (U) U.S. delegation met with the Russian delegation on the margins of EC-44. Russian participants included Elena Rodyushkina, Anna Lukashina, Leonid Liangasov, Viktor Smirnovsky, and Petr Svirin. U.S. provided the Russians with a non-paper drawn from EC-44 guidance prior to consultations. The primary purpose of the meeting was to request detailed information on the status of documentation at Russia's two newest destruction facilities, specific technologies employed at these sites, and future plans for destruction. U.S. also

provided a draft revision of language for the Newport Facility Agreement and Verification Plan for Moscow's review. The Russian delegation was significantly more responsive than in previous sessions, and provided a surprising amount of detail that in all cases closely matched what TS staff had explained.

¶42. (U) The U.S. inquired as to possible reasons for the delay in distribution of documents for the Kambarka facility, and stressed its belief that timely provision of documentation is essential in ensuring transparency. The Russians assured the U.S. of its intention to provide documents in time for EC-45 consideration. Rodyushkina then explained that four major issues remain. First, Russia has some concerns about TS insistence that all equipment items from the approved list be brought on site, primarily for reasons having to do with transportation costs. Russia also has concerns with the use of NDE equipment on agent storage tanks. Russia has requested that a full equipment list be included in the FA, with corresponding restrictions on its use.

¶43. (U) Second, the TS has requested Russia change some of the camera positions from their current configuration in the storage buildings. Russia is reluctant to reposition cameras in the first storage building, as agent is already being destroyed from this building, which presents safety concerns in modifying equipment. Del rep inquired as to whether Russia would then at least consider changes to the four remaining buildings; Rodyushkina replied that cost will also be a factor. Third, the TS and Russia seem to disagree on whether agent volume or mass should be recorded in tracking quantity destroyed. One possible solution would be the introduction of further calculations using density as flow

meter readings are obtained. Finally, the TS had requested that Russia declare the storage buildings as temporary storage areas, while Russia would prefer to declare the tanks as an integral part of the destruction process. It seems, however, that in this case Russia is willing to accept the TS proposal.

¶44. (U) The U.S. also requested information on the status of the FA and VP for Maradykovsky. Russia stated that the TS has scheduled its Final Engineering Review in May, at which point additional changes to monitoring equipment may be made before documents are finalized. The U.S. then asked how Russia intended to conduct destruction operations for its second train (smaller munitions). Rodyushkina replied that a more traditional approach will be applied, in which agent is drained from munitions into a neutralization reactor. There are a limited number of munitions with a mustard/lewisite mixture, for which Russia plans to construct a separate destruction unit for neutralization with monoethanol. The reaction mass will be disposed of in a thermal treatment unit (Del comment: this term seems to be used interchangeably with incinerator) in Building 101, adjacent to the main technical building, Building 1047. Construction has evidently begun on the incinerator foundation. Reaction mass from both trains will be fed to accumulation vessels, and then into the incinerator. A metal parts furnace with an afterburner is also being constructed.

¶45. (U) The U.S. inquired as to whether similar processes would be used at Leonidovka and Pochep, given the similarities between stockpiles. Russia stated that a similar neutralization technology will be used at Leonidovka, but that a more traditional approach will probably be used at Pochep, given the distance between the storage and destruction facilities at this site. The U.S. also asked whether Russia intended to dispose of all reaction masses through on-site incineration. Russia replied that hydrolysate disposal was dependent on several factors, to include new environmental regulations, cost, and practicability. Rodyushkina confirmed that Russia does intend to construct an on-site incinerator at Leonidovka, but that reaction mass from Pochep may need to be transported elsewhere.

¶46. (U) The U.S. distributed proposed changes to the Newport documents (based on consultations with Germany), and asked whether Russia was prepared to approve the documents even without these changes. The Russians requested more time to consider the changes in the context of the full document, but asked whether the hydrolysate was being stored at the facility, and how agent quantity destroyed was being tracked. The U.S. explained the current on-site storage arrangement, and the fact that no destruction credit will be taken until the hydrolysate undergoes secondary treatment. The U.S. highlighted the fact that the new language proposed now explicitly states the requirement for EC approval of changes involving the TSDF.

¶47. (U) Finally, the U.S. asked whether Russia intended to circulate a new draft of its 45% extension request, based on concerns numerous delegations had expressed about language clearly linking Russia's ability to meet CW destruction deadlines with provision of international assistance. The U.S. again expressed its concern over this language, and offered several possible alternatives. Lukashina explained that, realistically, Russia did require international assistance for progress with CW destruction, and was merely attempting to highlight this fact. Lukashina also noted that the language was preambular, not operative, and did not therefore imply an obligation for donor states. The U.S. pointed out that the language, simply by virtue of its presence in a decision document, implied a political linkage.

DONORS MEETING

¶48. (U) U.S. del reps attended the March 13 informal consultations on international assistance for Russia's CW destruction program. The meeting was chaired by Frank van Beuningen of the Dutch MFA, who facilitated a tour-de-table during which donor states gave an update on their financial commitments, and progress on construction at the various sites. Russia also made a statement, thanking all donor states at the beginning, but following with a status update from which U.S. efforts at Shchuch'ye were notably absent. U.S. del highlighted its overall monetary contributions so far, and current problems settling on a suitable contractor for Building 101. Overall, recent developments included conclusion of a bilateral agreement between France and Russia, beginning of destruction operations at Kambarka, and plans for a joint UK/Canada visit to Khizner in the near future.

¶49. (U) Germany made a more detailed statement explaining the background, as well as the current status, of its assistance efforts. Del later learned that this was at the request of van Beuningen, who is searching for ways to re-energize the donors meeting. He asked whether the U.S. would be willing to consider giving a similar presentation during the next meeting July 4, 2006. Finally, the Russian delegation called upon donor states to respond to Russia's EC-42 proposal for additional projects that could benefit from international assistance.

DISCUSSIONS WITH ALBANIA

¶50. (U) Members of the U.S. delegation and the program manager and deputy for the CTR/DTRA Albania CW-stockpile destruction project met with the Albanian delegation and TS representatives on the margins of the EC to review the draft facility agreement and draft verification plan for the Qaf-Molla CWDF. Final agreement was reached on the Facility Agreement and Verification Plan, as well as on the draft decision. Final concurrence with the agreed Facility Agreement is required from Tirana, with official submission to the TS expected by April 3, 2006, in time for distribution and consideration for approval during EC-45.

DESTRUCTION INFORMALS

¶51. (U) The TS as usual provided updates on the status of verification activities, chemical demilitarization and a review of progress on the destruction of CW and on the destruction or conversion of CWPf's for the period 02 December 2005 to 10 March 2006. Handouts were provided addressing the above.

¶52. (U) The U.S. made its presentation on the status of its destruction program, and received no questions from attendees. Russia gave a PowerPoint presentation on its CW destruction program with lots of pictures and colored charts, but provided nothing new. Shchuch'ye is still listed as beginning operations in 2008. The CWDF at Kambarka began operations on December 20 that were referred to as trial tests, and reported its draft verification plan and facility agreement (FA) as still with the TS. The U.S. learned that there are several outstanding issues relating to the FA. The TS conducted its initial visit in September 2005 to the

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Maradykovsky CWDF and Russia reported its plans to begin operations by second half of 2006. The verification plan for destruction and FA are also in the works. The CWDFs at Leonidovka and Pochep are supposed to become operational in 2008 with Kizner starting in 2009. The Gorny CWDF completed destruction operations. So far, Russia has been credited with destroying approximately 3% of its Category 1 CW. Germany provided an electronic presentation with lots of pictures and self-proclamation for German equipment and expertise in

assisting Russia with the destruction of its CW stockpile.

¶53. (U) The Indian delegation provided an oral presentation on its CW destruction operations. The CWPF at Borkhedi began operating in mid January and is expected to end its campaign in mid March. Its FA is still being worked with the TS. The next campaign is expected to start in July 2006. India has destroyed 53% of its Category 1 CW. India made no reference during the informals that it will be seeking an extension to the 100 percent deadline.

¶54. (U) A State Party gave an electronic presentation with no handouts. It explained its rationale behind its decision to seek an extension to the 100% deadline. The State Party began a new campaign on March 13; so far it has destroyed 67% of its Category 1 CW.

¶55. (U) Libya and Albania provided their pre-arranged briefing as coordinated by the U.S. There were no questions from SPs. China and Japan as usual gave the latest ACW updates. Both China and Japan stated that Japan would be seeking a deadline extension from the OPCW.

¶56. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL